Category Archives: Iraq

An analysis of the gathering storm clouds over the Korean peninsula

Back in January, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, a respected academic journal collating the world’s leading thinkers on global security and threats, altered their ‘Doomsday clock’ (initially established upon the founding of the agency in 1947), setting it to two and a half minutes to midnight. Midnight, of course, meaning: it’s over.

I am astonished the re-setting didn’t get more pertinent media coverage. This is, after all, the most respected journal on nuclear affairs, and any warning signal given by specialists in the field should be treated very seriously indeed.

The clock has been this late before, I should inform readers. The atomic analysts set it to two minutes to midnight back in 1953, upon the ending of the Korean War and heightened hostilities between the world’s two superpowers.

This morning I went back and read their reasonably short and concise report in light of the geo-political movements of recent days. It can be read here, for anybody interested. 

Particularly fascinating are the following two passages, which can be found on pages 3 and 7 respectively, precisely because they articulate North Korea’s role in both the intensifying of friction between nuclear powers and the adjusting of the Doomsday clock:

“North Korea conducted two more nuclear weapons tests, the second, in September, yielding about twice the explosive power of the first, in January. Pyongyang also relentlessly tested missiles, achieving a rate of about two launches per month in 2016. In his 2017 New Year’s statement, Kim Jong-un declared he would soon test a missile with an intercontinental range.”

…and

“The United States, China, Russia, and other concerned nations engage with North Korea to reduce nuclear risks. Neighbours in Asia face the most urgent threat, but as North Korea improves its nuclear and missile arsenals, the threat will rapidly become global. As we said last year and repeat here: Now is not the time to tighten North Korea’s isolation but to engage seriously in dialogue.”

I have thought for a while that North Korea, not ISIS, would prove to be Donald Trump’s biggest foreign policy challenge. This was primarily because, towards the latter stages of the previous United States administration, ISIS lost a lot of ground both in Syria and Iraq, whilst North Korea ramped up their nuclear development program. One threat seems to have leapfrogged the other.

The world appears to be inching towards nuclear conflict and an increasing proportion of hostilities are being driven by officials in Pyongyang. But we didn’t necessarily have to have arrived here. It is worth examining historical records.

In 1994 the United States and the DPRK signed what was coined in Washington as the ‘Framework Agreement’. The deal prescribed that the U.S withdraw hostile, pre-emptive military acts in the Korean peninsula and embark upon comprehensive trade and diplomatic relations, in exchange for an easing on economic sanctions and a halting to the development of North Korean nuclear weapons.

The agreement was successful, until about six years later when George W Bush became U.S president. He immediately dismissed the deal and re-imposed harsh sanctions, before labelling North Korea as the third wheel in what he referred to as the ‘axis of evil’.

Richard Perle, the former chair of the Defense Policy Board which advised the Bush administration’ Defense Department, said of the 1994 Framework Agreement that “the basic structure of the relationship implied in the Framework Agreement…is a relationship between a blackmailer and one who pays a blackmailer.”

In the mind of President Bush, Perle had painted the nature of the Clinton administration’s agreement with North Korea in a misleading fashion, and it may have resulted in a warping of Bush’s attitude towards dealing with the North Korean problem. So US-DPRK ties soured and North Korea resumed its nuclear weapons program.

But, a few years later in 2005, a new agreement was proposed. Pyongyang asked Washington to cease engaging in hostile military acts, to bring an end to crippling economic sanctions (effectively a non-aggression pact) and to enact provisions over a system to provide North Korea with low-enriched uranium for scientific purposes. In return, they promised to suspend their nuclear weapons program. I think this, much like the 1994 Accords, was a reasonable proposal.

Bush did not accept the agreement; something we now know to be a mistake. If we look at the situation now it appears as if, by flouting openly their nuclear progress, North Korea are beckoning for the United States to offer them some kind of deal.

They know that if they want something from the global hegemon, developing weapons is the only action they can carry out that will garner its attention and lure it into a dialogue. In a perverse way it is actually extremely sensible.

No longer can they wholeheartedly rely on the Chinese, too. China has grown increasingly frustrated with its communist neighbour, understandably tense parked next to a promiscuous nuclear state on the Asian continent and worried about a large-scale build up of refugees on the border that the two countries share (this could very well be why the Chinese have warned the US about war escalation).

The concern for the region now is a question of how far Pyongyang is willing to go with its nuclear program. Is it merely trying to attract the attention of the United States, as it has done so repeatedly over the past two and a half decades, with its long held aim of creating nuclear missiles capable of reaching continental America?

If the United States is to act quickly, it will have three options: intensive discussion starting soon, pre-emptive military strikes (which I think will happen) or harsher economic sanctions, which have been tried time and time again and usually result in strengthening Pyongyang’s intransigence in developing nuclear weapons.

John Delury, a professor of Chinese studies at Seoul University, wrote recently for Foreign Affairs: “North Korea will start focusing on its prosperity instead of its self-preservation only once it no longer has to worry about its own destruction. And North Korea will consider surrendering its nuclear deterrent only once it feels secure and prosperous and is economically integrated into Northeast Asia.”

I think he is correct. Pyongyang seeks reassurances, and will continue to pursue them aggressively. Kim Jong-un has already proven himself to be more forceful than his predecessor, conducting 35 missile tests and four nuclear missiles in his four years at the head of the North Korean regime. Jong-Un will also want to present his country as a force so as to incentivise his neighbours to act in ways that will calm his regime. There certainly seems to be a Machiavellian motive to all this.

Washington, on the other hand, is once again bemused. It is trying to figure out what its approach ought to be towards the DPRK. I fear we will see yet another display of Trumpist unilateral bombing, irrespective of China’s desperation for North Korea to remain as stable as it can possibly be.


Why defeating ISIS in Mosul is only the beginning for Iraq

The operation to liberate the ISIS stronghold of Mosul is underway, and some encouraging progress has already been made. The Iraqi military and the Peshmerga have recaptured a string of villages, including Nawaran and Khalidiya, and coalition forces are closing in on the centre of Mosul, where an intricate tunnelling network and a moat of oil tankers await them.

If all goes well, the offensive will last just a couple of months. Daesh know that they are running out of time and options in Iraq after a succession of heavy defeats. Ramadi, Baquba and Fallujah were all lost this year to strengthened Iraqi Armed Forces and huge efforts have also been made to attack IS communication through social media.

But let us not get ahead of ourselves. The battle ahead is crucial both for the future of Iraq and in the war against international terrorism, but it isn’t going to be as simple as a few territorial gains. Contingency planning must be precise in order to prevent a local backlash and conflict being waged amongst the powers engaged in the pursuit of ISIS.

It is very interesting, for example, that President Erdogan of Turkey has spent quite a bit of time in recent weeks citing the national oath; an oath which demands the restoration of both Kirkuk and Mosul to Turkish rule. Erdogan told the International Law Congress in Istanbul that it was ‘impossible to remain outside the Mosul equation’, and that “a history lies for us. If the gentlemen desire so, let them read the Misak-i Milli (National Oath) and understand what the place means to us.” A map proposed by the 1920 Ottoman oath can be seen here, clearly including large sections of Iraq: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misak-%C4%B1_Mill%C3%AE#/media/File:Misaki_Milli.jpg

Back in 1926, Turkey and Britain (then the regional colonial power) signed the Ankara Pact, upon the advice of the League of Nations Council, which officially designated Mosul to the newly established state of Iraq. Recep Erdogan, a staunch political conservative who maintains strong domestic support, may well be developing an imperial strategy in Iraq based on his country’s historical political aspirations.

It isn’t as crazy as it may seem. Strategic and territorial Turkish-Iraqi disputes are decades old. Take the case of Bashiqa, a town located 10 miles north of Mosul. Despite strong opposition from Iraq’s government, Turkey maintains a hefty military presence at its base there, and seems more than willing to use its troops to influence the campaign to rid northern Iraq of ISIS.

One side battle, therefore, is how to prevent almost inevitable military conflict brewing between Iraq and an ambitious state of Turkey. The BBC reported just two days ago that “US Secretary of Defence Ash Carter made the point explicitly at the end of last week when, on a visit to Baghdad, he reaffirmed “the vital importance of every country operating with full respect for Iraqi sovereignty”. His words were quite obviously directed at Erdogan. (One has to wonder what the implications for Turkey’s NATO membership would be if territorial goals in Iraq were pursued with vigour over the coming months)

Another battle is more subtle and less likely to be accurately reported on after the offensive is over. Gaining the support of the local population (an objective made harder to achieve by the strategic interests of competing regional powers) is crucial to Mosul’s long-term stability. Patrick Cockburn, one of Britain’s best foreign correspondents, wrote in his book The Rise of Islamic State that ‘the fall of Mosul was the result of a popular uprising as well as military assault. The Iraqi army was detested as a foreign occupying force of Shia soldiers, regarded in Mosul as creatures of an Iranian puppet regime led by Maliki’ (then the shia Prime Minister of Iraq).

Mosul, once a content city of two million Sunni Muslims (more recent population figures are rather difficult to obtain), objected fiercely to being defended by soldiers it regarded as alien. This civil dispute became a handy smokescreen and weakness for ISIS to exploit in the original battle for Mosul in June 2014. Local residents, however wary they were of the Islamic State’s intentions for the city, accepted that as a branch of Sunni Islam they represented the lesser of two evils.

Two years on, though, and it would seem that this is no longer true. The sheer barbarism of ISIS’ regime (recent chemical attacks, the mass execution of citizens and their use as human shields acting as depressing proof of this) has left thousands desperate for liberation. But will Iraqi Armed Forces, directed by the Shia Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, be able to regain the support of the locals who helped to drive them out two years ago? Will civilians in Mosul instead look to Turkey for solace after several years of disenchantment?

Turkish foreign minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, revealed recently that his country’s plan was to create a safe haven for refugees in northern Iraq; a move that will certainly heighten Prime Minister Abadi’s sensitivities. Prime Minister Yildirim of Turkey suggested that a haven was necessary in order to protect citizens against what a called ‘a common threat’; namely, the PKK, but it would seem more likely that the policy is designed to grab a piece of the Iraqi pie and maximise influence in an oil-rich and strategically crucial part of the Middle East.

So defeating ISIS in Mosul may well be the easy part. Coordinating the removal of forces and winning over the local population whilst preserving Iraqi sovereignty in Mosul, on the other hand, could be the real battle ahead.


Russia, Iran, Syria and a whole load of hypocrisy

Some rather unsurprising developments caught my eye yesterday afternoon concerning the ongoing Syrian civil war and, in particular, the not-so-secret involvement of both Russia and Iran. Perhaps September 25th will have to go down as international hypocrisy day, as the two regional powers faced intense accusations from three western powers concerning what they called ‘war crimes’ in Syria. Three news articles in particular may interest readers at this blog:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-37468080 (accusation number 1, from an American diplomat at the UN)

http://www.itv.com/news/2016-09-25/russia-hits-back-at-boris-johnsons-syria-war-crime-slur/ (accusation number 2, this time from the United Kingdom’s new foreign secretary Al Johnson)

http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran-and-Russia-in-danger-of-becoming-war-crimes-accomplices-468663 (and finally a small contribution from French foreign minister Jean-Marc Ayrault)

I must stress right away that I do not deny and have not denied the links between Iranian and Russian action in Syria and the intensifying civil war. Iran’s funding of terrorism in Syria; the tail country of the so-called ‘Shia crescent’ has been a continued and deliberate ploy to further destabilise a now ravaged and desperate nation. Russia’s bombing campaigns are hardly secret, and it would seem that agreed ceasefires with the United States (which are crucial to the fostering of any kind of productive or peaceful settlement) have gone largely ignored in the Kremlin.

I am personally convinced that the Russians and Iranians are sensing that the Syrian military are growing in confidence. Israeli commentator Yossi Melman recently attributed the shooting down of two Israeli aircraft in the Quneitra region on the part of Assad’s government to this renewed confidence. It is not hard to imagine that, given recent successes in Damascus against both non-aligned rebels and Islamic State, Assad’s forces are beginning to feel a sense of control once more.

The Syrian military are coming off the heels of a slightly more successful summer. Notable gains were made in Aleppo, and three strategic locations were wrestled from the al-Nusra front (Syria’s Al-Qaeda affiliate) in the western province of Hama. From the perspective of Russian and Iranian foreign policy and their diplomats, this would therefore seem a bad time to adhere to any proposed plans for a ceasefire. While momentum appears to be going the way of the Russian and Iranian-backed regime, why stop now?

You can see why western powers are frustrated. It is particularly amusing to see the ‘war crimes’ line thrown out in an attempt to demonise two countries following an entirely reasonable strategic goal (though the way it has without doubt been followed has been counter-productive to peace). War crimes have become a thing in the Middle East not in recent years, but in fact many years prior to the Arab Spring. But again, the question of hypocrisy comes ringing back to me.

The United States, Britain, France and Saudi Arabia do not, contrary to their claims, have any principled objections to war crimes in Syria. If they did, then why, as Patrick Cockburn notes in his fantastically concise book ‘The rise of Islamic State’, would they have sought to play such an active role in laying down the fertile soil out of which ISIS would grow. More recently, in fact, United States-led airstrikes killed 28 civilians in a ruthless attack on al-Ghandour, a small town in the northwestern countryside of Manbij.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights – responsible for accounting for the suffering of non-combatants in the ongoing Syrian crisis – recently noted of the 28 innocents (allegedly including both women and children): “They were killed when the warplanes of the international coalition committed a massacre in the town of al-Ghandour, and the death toll is expected to rise because there are some people in critical situation.”

These points are made over and over again, but they are important. The Syrian civil war has long been a proxy for major powers to flex their military muscles in an attempt to further their own interests. How sad it is that so many young children have to pay the price for this never ending stupidity. Also stupid was the insinuation that Iran would support a ceasefire in Syria, even temporary, between the United States and Russia.

In the case of Syria, the strategic goals of Russia and the United States are in direct contravention to one another. Since Iran’s vision for Syria requires its tactical alliance with Russia to be maintained for the foreseeable future, it would appear that any longstanding ceasefire between the two major powers could threaten the political interests of Tehran in the Syrian conflict. President Rouhani said in an interview recently that to ground all planes would “benefit the terrorists 100%” as IS would be able to continue with their ‘savage killings’.

Both Iran and Russia remain adamant that Syria is stronger, at least in the short term, with Assad in power. A strong argument can be made to support this. Former CIA analyst and respected foreign policy commentator Graham Fuller has explained in the past that many Syrians (including large Sunni and minority communities) now accept that preserving Assad’s power could well be preferable to despotic alternatives. In Iraq, Sunni communities saw ISIS as a lesser of two evils, the same is not true in Syria. For Russia, it is about preserving and extending its geo-strategic influence in the region. For Iran, it is about protecting Shia communities and combating Sunni terrorism – funded and supported, in large part, by the very countries ‘seeking to establish’ a ceasefire in Syria.

The devastating effects of the Syrian civil war remain only a bloody backdrop to a posturing deadlock between major world powers. It’s about time they were pushed to the foreground.

 


Don’t be fooled by Saudi Arabia’s front against ISIS

When Prince Bandar bin Sultan, formerly Washington’s Saudi ambassador and head of Saudi Arabian intelligence, sat down with then MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove shortly before 9/11, he warned quite prophetically: “The time is not far off in the Middle East, Richard, when it will be literally ‘God help the Shia’. More than a billion Sunnis have simply had enough of them.”

Startlingly ominous as we now know this to be, those interested in Middle Eastern conflict would do well to acknowledge the significance of the quote. It provides a clear and incisive backdrop into one of the most deep-rooted and bloody conflicts of the twentieth, and now twenty-first, century. The Sunni-Shia divide, framed much more clearly in terms of Saudi Arabia-Iran, has until the present day created a serious of region-shattering proxy wars, with devastating consequences.

Saudi Arabia’s role, both locally and internationally, in promoting the practice of Wahhabism (a fundamentalist, literalist version of Sunni Islam) is now well-documented. Thanks to brilliant work from Robert Fisk, Patrick Cockburn and Jason Burke, among many other distinguished writers and journalists, Saudi Arabian involvement in the harbouring and growth of the Islamic State is now widely accepted.

Incessant armament supplies, intense propaganda campaigns and the funding of the spread of Wahhabi practice have allowed the Saudis a strong foothold in both Iraqi and Syrian affairs in the form of ISIS, the shiny new plaything of militant, Sunni fundamentalism. Assisted by Qatar and the other Gulf Monarchies, Saudi Arabian foreign policy has quite literally advocated the scourge of Shi’ite Muslims from the Middle East, a ploy which has, to some considerable extent, succeeded.

If it wasn’t for an equally authoritarian, equally intense and equally hate-filled Shi’ite campaign against the various sects of Sunni Islam, ISIS’ growth would have been far more rapid. The Shia crescent, as it has become known, through Iran, Lebanon and Syria, has waged war with equal merit and pummeling devastation. The Iranian regime, expressed externally through its funding of Hezbollah, (a terror group in Southern Lebanon and now fighting alongside Assad’s forces in Western Syria) has become a potent counterweight to Sunni and Wahhabi expansionism.

With the conclusion of 2015’s Iran Nuclear deal, sanctions lifted against Iran quite recently have allowed the Shi’ite regime substantially more financial freedom. How the Iranians spend the cash will be interesting to see, but I suspect that both Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Saudis will be hugely disappointed. With more money in the coffers, it would be prudent to assume that funding to both Assad’s government and Hezbollah will increase at a notable rate.

And so herein lies Saudi Arabia’s decision to go to war with ISIS. Fearing stronger Iranian-Western relations, the Gulf power knows that it must do anything it can to either reclaim lost support from the United States, or draw attention from bolstered Iranian diplomacy. I wasn’t especially surprised by either Saudi Arabia’s pledge to take 150,000 troops to Syria, nor by the timing of the announcement. Iran and Saudi Arabia’s bitterly competitive, sibling-esque relationship would be humorous if so many innocent lives were not at stake.

Saudi Arabia’s hierarchy do not want military confrontation with ISIS. Firstly, because they support the religious essence of the newly-established regime, and secondly because it may sprout civil conflict between angry ISIS sympathisers (of which there are probably a few million) within Saudi Arabia itself. Instead, the decision to go to war against the Islamic State is merely a tactical foreign policy endeavour, designed to usher in the backing of western powers, whilst simultaneously appearing much more forcefully to bring about peace and stability across the Levant (something made practically impossible by the artificiality of post-war drawn borders).

And so it would be wise to urge caution to all those taken in by Saudi Arabia’s new war against ISIS. Just how a military campaign will work out between the Saudis and the group they actively nurtured remains, for the time being, unclear. I suspect conflict will be minimal and likely non-consequential, just how the monarchy would like it. Nor, too, would I rule out the possibility of armed troops being used to aid the Islamic State in various forms in a bid to retain influence in both Syria and Iraq.

Never have I seen a more transparent military campaign in all my short life, and I certainly hope that my government isn’t reeled in by it. The Saudis are not our allies, (they despise our relative freedom and rampant atheism) and have been far too compliant with the ISIS cause than perhaps members of the Royal Family will care to admit. 150,000 troops seems a hefty contribution, and may even appear productive in the so-called ‘war on terror’, but do try your best not to be fooled by it.

 

 

 

 


Book review: The Rise of Islamic State

img_2987If you read one book on Middle Eastern affairs in 2016, make it Patrick Cockburn’s ‘The Rise of Islamic State’.

‘Patrick spotted the emergence of ISIS much earlier than anybody else and wrote about it with a depth of understanding in a league of its own’ reads one of the book’s more sparkling, and may I say, understated reviews.

Not only does his book bring everything into a context both concise and easy to understand, (by no means an easy feat when one considers the complexity of Middle Eastern struggles in the twenty first century) Patrick also sheds fascinating light on just who is responsible for the group’s growth, how they have achieved what they have achieved, and whom ISIS can thank for their success.

Not lacking in controversy, Cockburn rightly calls out the gulf monarchies (particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar) for their ill-judged, menacing and deliberately destabilising foreign policies (evident primarily in their funding of radicalisation), as well as the west’s laughable attempts at ‘intervention’ in previous years which have created such hospitable conditions for the Levant’s Islamic State.

Filled with credible sources, eye-witness accounts and the interesting analysis of various informants, the book manages to do what, it seems, no other media outlet, nor any government has been able to do: pinpoint and describe causation of ISIS’ rise, attribute it to the right actions and events, and (even more crucially) convey these explanations in a manner that is coherent, even to somebody with only a minute understanding of the region’s problems.

Throughout the book, which took me scarcely three hours to read and left me with a huge increase in the breadth of my knowledge, startling comparisons are made between the Iraqi regimes of Mr Hussain and Mr Maliki, and stories from within Iraqi towns and armies reveal just how ISIS were able to take such a large portion of land from Iraq during assaults on both Mosul and Fallujah.

Also revealed in Cockburn’s wonderfully informative and authoritative book is the importance of both national and social media in terms of its galvanisation of jihad in, particularly, Syria, where the beheading group took full advantage of the bloody civil war which erupted during the latter periods of the so-called Arab Spring.

The author manages to explain why our ‘war on terror’ failed in its attempts to encourage solidarity and peace in the Arab world, the importance of the Sunni-Shia divide within Islam and how it has contributed to events in both Iraq and Syria, and perhaps most intriguingly, includes day-by-day accounts of ISIS-operated military endeavours in the Middle East.

Combining the pace and intrigue of a spy novel, articulation of an encyclopedia and controversy of an Alex Jones radio show, Patrick Cockburn’s ‘The Rise of Islamic State’ is everything you need to read on the Levant’s frightening new jihadi mould, in only 140 pages.

“The Middle East is entering a long period of ferment in which counterrevolution may prove as difficult to consolidate as revolution itself”, reads Patrick’s beautifully accurate final sentence, in a book which I couldn’t recommend to readers strongly enough.

 

 


All this Syria fuss and we’ve forgotten the one Middle Eastern conflict we’re ACTUALLY obliged to resolve

Earlier on this evening, British members of parliament staged a cross-party debate and voted for strategic RAF airstrikes in Syria, with the goal of degrading Islamic State. David Cameron said in the House of Commons only today that the proposed airstrikes will make Britain a safer country to live in, though how that is I am not exactly sure.

Our rash and likely emotionally-charged inclination to war has served both the UK and the Middle East poorly before, and seldom are we capable of putting together a sensible, internationally-organised and long-term plan to achieve our military goals.

I am not entirely opposed to war, and nor am I a pacifist. Just last month, I wrote a piece on this blog in which I openly endorsed the prospect of military action on the pre-condition that the British armed forces work with suitable international partners. Please also take the time to read that piece, below:

https://norgroveblog.com/2015/11/17/why-i-now-support-internationally-organised-military-action-against-islamic-state/

But here is my problem. We have found ourselves in the midst of yet another obsessive, compulsive need to interfere in regions we aren’t required to interfere in, and we must rely on the utterly unreliable. We seem to have completely forgotten our own blotchy and questionable past military endeavours; many of which resulted in the kind of territorial disasters we aimed to prevent in the first place.

Iraq, anybody?

There is, though, one conflict very much on-going in the Middle East which this country has ignored, (likely out of sheer embarrassment) and whose development arose directly as a result of the 1920 British Mandate for the geographical region of Palestine.

Only this week, Israel have announced new restrictions on Gaza’s Palestinians seeking medical treatment, with those under the age of 55 now having to undergo thorough security checks in order to establish eligibility for operations and medical procedures in Israel or the West Bank.

And so forgive me for brushing down the importance of today’s Syria vote in the House of Commons, but I really think Britain’s attention in the Middle East is best served elsewhere. The more Israeli and Palestinian blood spilled, the more I am sickened by the British Empire’s shameful distribution of the region of Palestine.

Yes, our part in the destabilisation of Syria and the Levant cannot be completely forgotten, but in no way can it be compared to the disgraceful neglect we have shown towards the people of Gaza, West Bank and Israel. Islamic State are accountable for their own mass-murdering, Bashar Al-Assad is responsible for his own repression of Syrian citizens, and interference on the part of Hezbollah and the Kurds can’t be attributed to British activity either.

The 90-year dispute concerning the inhabitants of Palestine has, in my mind, been overlooked by our media, and by the international community. Not enough is being done by Britain, the US or the United Nations to help bring about long-lasting peace for both Arabs and Jews. It offends me to my very core that we have given hundreds of column inches and hours of broadcasting time to jihad in Syria, when children in both Israel and Palestine are being slaughtered by our historical incompetence daily.

I didn’t want to make this post particularly long, so I will leave it here for now. Britain is set to embark on yet another international bombing campaign in Syria, whilst refusing to accept liability for the damage it has caused just a few miles to the south.

I would laugh, if it wasn’t so serious.

 


The west should listen to Putin on Syria, he’s no fool

They say that desperate times call for desperate measures.

At least that was the view of Russia’s parliament in the Kremlin at the beginning of the week, as immediate air strikes in Syria were prescribed the correct way to deal with the country’s severe militant conflict.

The situation in the region has reached breaking point in recent months, with large parts of the country completely blacked out and others policed by Islamic State. In one of the world’s most complex ongoing conflicts, Putin has stacked his cards behind the lesser of two evils, and has chosen to assist Assad’s fighting forces.

Vladimir Putin’s sharp and decisive leadership is exactly what you would want from a modern world leader. Whilst Barack Obama deliberates over exactly whom Syrian’s rightful president should be, a war is raging and western countries are standing by raising far more questions than they are solutions.

Russian airstrikes over Syria targeting Islamic State-controlled areas should provide Syria’s official government with the military support and time they need to assess their options and fight back effectively. Apparently only the French in Europe share the same, logical mindset. I wish my country would do much more to get involved. We did, after all, contribute to some of this mess.

Innocent lives will be lost in this war; of that there can be no doubt. The problem that surrounding nations face is that there is no clear side to favour. Assad’s regime has led to the slaughtering, poisoning and torturing of his own peoples, (among them many thousands of women and children) but the same, too, can be said of ISIS.

Putin is no fool, I’m sorry to announce. He read the political and military situations in Iran, India and Libya to perfection, and that trend has continued with his desire to intervene in Syria. Give him credit, he doesn’t do democracy or equality particularly well, but the intelligence he deploys towards resolving foreign diplomatic or military conquests is to be admired.

At least the people of Russia can sleep safe in the knowledge that their president intends to keep them all safe, regardless of whether or not he likes them.

Syria is currently experiencing its most ghastly and unpredictable anarchy in its history, and it seems only Russia have kept this fact in mind. Islamic State poses a threat potentially to the entire world, and if we don’t attempt to suppress it now, we may end up regretting it sooner rather than later.

This solemn fact is an uneasy one to digest, but it should put Jeremy Corbyn’s prime ministerial bid into perspective for just a few moments. Take the time to consider that Corbyn would like an army and nuclear-less Britain, and you begin to wonder just how much of a chance he has of obtaining office.

I shudder at the thought of Vladimir Putin addressing a scruffy-looking Jeremy Corbyn on a state visit.

The European Union, British parliament and United States may have political and social differences with Russia, but when it comes to foreign policy, there is no leader on this planet more focused and effective than Vladimir Putin.

It’s time we stopped the procrastinating, deliberation and political point-scoring and recognised that it would be far better to join Russia, than to oppose them. This conflict has only one realistically satisfying conclusion for the west, and that means supporting Assad until his eventual personal demise.

Russia’s president phrased it succinctly and accurately this week when he said: “Our position is based on the concern that Syria might submerge into the same situation as Libya, or even Iraq. We are urging all of our partners to make additional efforts to fight this absolutely evil fundamentalism.”

After all, desperate times call for desperate measures. Putin gets it, why does nobody else?